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The "money question" is again in the spotlight of public
attention. Of cotirse, in our pecuniary economy, money is altt^s
important. A modern industrialized society makes use of checks
against bank deposits for the greater part of its money payments.
The volume of these deposits is influenced by bank loans and
investments, by the economic situation, by treasury financing,
the stock of gold, and by mai^ other factors. So monetary pro¬
blems quickly become very complex.
Looking back over the past hundred years, we can see that
various facets of our complex monetary system, in trim, have come
into the focus of public attention. After the Civil War it was
machinery for redeeming bank notes at par value. Later, there
was the problem of seasonal shortages of currency, and the
disappearance of money during financial panics.
In the Gay Nineties, the primary monetary issue was
bimetallism - the issue of "free silver." Afl^er this was settled
by the Gold Standard Act of 1900, the prime money problem - that
of creating a flexible currency supply and establishing central
control of banking reserves - was solved by passing the Federal
Reserve Act in 1913• The Great Depression of the thirties brought
the problem of frozen bank assets; and drastic reforms were made
in the Banking Acta of 1933 and 1935« Since World War II the
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federal government has relied heavily upon monetary policies to
steer the American economy on a course of steady growth while
avoiding price inflation. It is natural, therefore, that the
particular aspect of the "money question" now receiving most
attention is monetary policy.
CHAFTER I
BACKGROUND OF MONETAE! POLICT
The Classical Background,—The term "classical economics"
means the traditional or orthodox p:‘inciples of economics vhich
have been handed down and generally accepted, with reservations,
by academic economists since the time of David Ricardo, an Bn^ish
economist of the earl7 nineteenth century*^ This set of principles
has been widely accepted and therefore merits the label "classical,"
Classical economic theories rest on the assumption of full
maployment of labor and other resources. There may be lapses
f2*om full employment, but these are regarded as abnormal and their
explanation does not constitute a basic part of the subject matter
of classical economics. If at any time there is not actually full
employment, the classical theory asserts there is always a
tendency toward full employment*^ The normal situation is stable
equilibrium at full employment. If disturbances do persist, it
is attributed by the classical school to interferrence by government
■^Dudley Dillard, The Economics of Joto Maynard Keynes
(New York; Printice-Hall, Inc,, Ipl+B), p, lU,
A, C, Pigou, Equilibrium and Bnployment (London; MacMillan
and Co,, Ltd,, I9UI), p. 7^,
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or private monopoly with the free play of market forces* As a
general rule to idiich there are minor exceptions, the social
policy which guarantees normal full employment is laissez - fairs,
the absence of government control of private enterprise*
Classical theory focuses on the use of a given quantity of
resoTirces by individual firms and individual industries within
the economic system as a whole* If more resources are employed
in one industry, they are assmed to be drawn away from other
industries* If more resources are employed by one firm, they are
assumed to be drawn away from other firms* Thus the choice is
between employment and tmemployment* Additions to total output
in one direction are at the expense of deductions from total out¬
put somewhere else in the economic system and are not additions
to total output resulting from putting to work previously
unemployed resources*
The assertion that classical economic theory rests on the
assumption of fall employment calls definition of "full employ¬
ment" and "•unemployment"* It is more accurate to say that the
classical position assumes there is no involuntary unemployment*
Voluntary unemployment exists when potential workers are unwill¬
ing to accept the going wage or wages slightly less than the
going wage* Workers on strike for higher wages are an example
of voluntary unemplcyment. They are voluntarily tmemployed in
the sense that by taking a lower wage than they are asking they
could be employed*
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Frictional unemployDient exists when men are temporarily
out of work because of imperfections in the labor market. Many
factors may accoiint for frictional unemployment: the immobility
of labor, the seasonal nature of some work, shortages of materials,
breakdowns in machinery and equipment, ignorance of job opportuni¬
ties, et cetera. In a dynamic society in which some industries
are declining and others are rising and in which people are free
to work wherever they wish, providing they can find a job, the
volume of frictional unemployment may be fairly large at any
time. In the United States, where the total labor force is
approximately sixty million, it is estimated that frictional
unemployment averages at least two million, or about three per
cent, at all times. Frictional xinemployment is undesirable and
every possible step should be taken to minimize it within the
limits of freedom of occupational choice, but it is not a major
problem because employable persons seeking work will not, as a
rule, remain unemployed for frictional reasons more than a few
weeks or months.
"Full employmaat" as thus defined is consistent with
voluntary unemployment and allows for a certain amount of
frictional imemployment. Full employment exists in the absence
of involuntary unemployment. In the classical theory, this type
of unemployment does not exist,^ While there is more involved
^A, C, Pigou, Economics of Welfare (London: MacMillan and
Co,, Ltd,, 19U1), p. 127.
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than mere facts, issues like this must ultimately be resolved by
an appeal to common sense and the hard facts of expezdlence*
Monetary policy, in its early stages, was formulated out
of this mode of thinking. However, in later years an English
economist by the name of ilohn Maynard Keynes revolutionized this
mode t>f thinking which formed the basis of monetary policy. He
objected strongly to this classical theory,
TOiat Keynes objected to most strongly in the classical
reasoning was the notion that unemployment would disappear if
workers would Just accept sufficiently low wage rates. There are
two aspects of Keynes’ objection to the classical view that flex¬
ible wage rates will cure employment. The first may be called
the practical and the second the theoretical aspect.
In a practical sense labor unions are an integral part of
modern democratic economics, and welfare legislation such as
minimum-wage laws and nnemployment insurance are probably here to
stay. Therefore, it is bad politics even if it shoiild be con¬
sidered good economics to object to labor unions and to liberal
labor legislation. The classical solution of lower wage rates
could only be realized in a freely competitive labor market or
in a completely authoritarian economy. In democratic societies,
which both Keynes and the classical economists pre-suppose, labor
unions are not likely to be eliminated. Minimum wage laws are
not likely to be repealed. Unemployment compensation is not
likely to be lowered, and public opinion as to what constitutes
a reasonable living wage is not likely to be revised downwards
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in the li^t of the tremendous productivity of modem technology.
A minimum charge agsdnst the classical theory of unemploy¬
ment is its irrelevance as a guide to policy under conditions as
they have come to exist in the actual world of the past several
decades and as they will probably continue to exist in the
foreseeable future.
However, even if all the conditions necessary to restore
perfectly free competition among wage earners might, by some
miracle, be realized, this would not meet Keynes* fiindamental
challenge to the classical school. His theory of employment and
unCTiployment does not rest on the premise of rigid wage rates.
He contends that the volume of employment is determined by effec¬
tive deioand and not by the wage bargains between workers and
enqjloyers. Keynes' ultimate theoretical explanation of unonploy-
ment rests on the stickiness of the interest rates taken in
conjunction with the irrationality of business men's expectations
about investment in durable capital assets.^ In Keynes' view,
the peculiar characteristics of a developed monetary economy
account for xmemployment. Even if wage rates were perfectly
flexible and commodity prices perfectly competitive, unemployment
could still exist. His explanation of unemployment does not
depend on the decline of competition of recent decades.
The great fault of the classical theory is its irrelevance
to conditions in the contemporary capitalist world. In many
^J. M. K^nes The General Theory of Employment. Interest
and Money (New Tork: Harcourt, Brace and Cranpaiy, 193o)> p*
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significant respects, the classical theory, as summed up by Alfred
Marshall, is more useful in a socialistic economy, which may be
assumed to conform closely to the ideal of full employment. In
capitalist econtmiics idiere widespread unemployment, business cycles,
inflation, and other forms of instability constitute the chief pro¬
blem of public policy, the basic need is for a theory which will
diagnose these ills in a sianner which will furnish a guide to action
for their solution or alleviation. Such a new and more relevant
theory emerged in Keynes* General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Money. In his book Keynes states that
I shall argue that the postulates of the classical
theory are applicable to a special case only and
not to the general case . • • moreover, the
characteristics of the special case assumed by the
classical theory happen not to be those of the
economic society in which we actually live, with
the result that its teaching is misleading and
disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the facts
of experience.!
The Period of the Great Crash.—The great depression of the
1930* s, like all depressions, involved tremendous loss of human
and material values. Mass unemployment is second, perhaps, only
to war in the magnitude of its human degradation and physical
wastefulness. The world was poor not because it lacked material
resources, technical skills, or the will to work, or even because
it misallocated its employed resourcesj it was because something




By 1933» the Aroerican economy had completed about a half
century of rapid industrialization. Population had risen to 95
million^ and the current value of gross national product was $U0
billion. The long deflation of prices which followed the Civil
War was receding into the past; for more than fifteen years prices
had been advancing. The Gold Standard Act of 1900 put an end to
debate over bimetallism^ and by 1913 half the nation's coin and
currency consisted of gold coins or gold certificates fully backed
by coin. Other types of currency, such as silver certificates.
United States notes, and national-bank notes, were all convertible
into gold on demand.
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 compromised on many points
of dispute and was deliberately ambiguous on others. It started
operations during the txirbxilance of World War I, A period of
relative success and stability in the 1920's ended in the stock-
market crash and the Depression of the 1930's. Inability of the
Federal Reserve to prevent the worst financial panic in American
history led to extensive changes in its structure and in the
financial system generally. Since the changes of the 1930's
largely created our modern financial system, it is important to
see wl^ they occurred as they did.
In 1922 and 1923> important changes appeared in the
attitudes of Reserve officials towards their responsibilities and
techniques. This change was most pronounced in the case of
Benjamin Strong. Disappointed at the performance of the economy
since I9IU, Strong argued that Federal Reserve policy could not
function adequately if it followed mechanical guides such as its
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gold reserve or the commercial-loan theory. He rejected the idea
of qualitative control, realizing that the nature of the lOU's
rediscotinted vas no indication of the use to which a bank might
put the proceeds. Strong came to hold the view that the proper
goal of monetary policy was the stabilization of economic activity
and that c^antitative r§ther than qualitative approach was needed.^
It was an ironic paradox that the greatest failure of Federal
Reserve policy came after its objectives, theories, and powers
had been developed to a high degree of sophistication and after
their exercises had won extensive public confidence. In retrospect,
it is clear that the Federal Reserve and the financial system still
contained serious deficiencies which rendered them very vulnerable.
Federal Reserve actions in the mid-1920's were chiefly
directed at offsetting fluctuations in the domestic economy. At
first, stock prices paralleled rising profits, but as time passed,
the prices became increasiixgly speculative. Margin require¬
ments, subject to no legal restrictions, were often as low as 20
per cent, and credit buying grew rapidly. The volume of brokers'
loans rose from $2 billion in 192k to billion in 1927 and
reached a peak above $8 billion in 1929* By the end of 1928, member
bank loans on securities amounted to almost $10 billion and
constituted 1^0 per cent of their total loans. This growth was made
possible by a rapid rise of time deposits; indeed, some corporations
^lester V. Chandler, BenjamiJi Strong, Central Banker, The
Brookings Institute (Washington, 1958), pp. 39-53»
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engaged in arbitrage by issuing stock and using the proceeds to
acquire tiiae deposits or make loans to brokers. VIhile neither the
money supply or ©IP velocity rose appreciably in the late 1920's,
transactions velocity, as measured by the turnover of demand de¬
posits, shot up from 38 in 1926 to in 1929*
Frcan mid-1927 to mid-1929 stock prices approximately doubled,
ad did the volumn of stock-market credit. Rising prices enabled
speculators to pyramid their holdings, since they could borrow more
on a given stock when its price went up. Investment companies,
which had not amoxinted to much in American finance previously,
multiplied. Professor Gailbraith estimates that by 1929 new ones
were being spawned "at the rate of approximately one each business
day." Some of these were downright fraudulent, and mary more were
simply carelessly thrown together and incompetently managed, with
little accurate public disclosure of their affairs. The b\ill market
encouraged misrepresentation, manipulation, and shipshod conduct
among many other financial and non-financial firms as well.l
The econony took a downward turn in July, 1929, several months
before the market crash, VJhy did it? The condition of productive
business in the period since 1927 had been one of placid prosperity
by comparison with the tvirbulance of Idle stock market. Although
uneaoiployment was low, there was no great pressure on production
capacity, ^diich was evidenced by the absence of price increases.
In fact, the boom probably ended because capacity had. out ran
John Kenneth Gailbraith, The Great Crash (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1955i), p»
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CTirrent or prospective demand, so that subsquent capital expendi-
txires were reduced. The investment boom had been aided in part by
war demands at home and construction abroad, as well as by the
initial requirements of a large population. These demands had
weakened, and the normal growth of consumption was insufficient
to compensate by itself. The stock boom and psychological aspira¬
tions encouraged businesses to add unduly to their capacity^ in
addition, a considerable volumn of speculative construction took
place, particularly in office buildings,^ The Empire State Build¬
ing, on which construction began in 1929, is a perfect example.
The "War-Time” and ”Post-¥ar" Periods,—During World War II,
Federal Reserve policy was subordinated to the Treasury objective
of financing the war-time deficits at the low interest rates of the
1930* s, Hi^ taxes and direct controls reduced the inflationary
force of war-time finance, but the public was left with tremendously
increased holdings of cash and liquid assets at the end of the war.
In consequence, there was a rapid rise of GNP expenditures after the
war that aided greatly in reconversion without depression but sent
the price level up further.
The Federal Reserve was deterred from virorous credit
restraint b7 i’ts policy of supporting treasury bonds at par,
althou^ it did allow short-term interest rates to rise. Recession
in 19k9 halted the inflation, but a new spurt came with the out
break of the Korean conflict in the summer of 19^0, Inability to
Robert A. Gordon, Business Fluctuations (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 19^2), pp, 3^7-389.
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exert effective credit control in this period finally led the
Federal Reserve to break away from h£uid support in the accord of
March, ISSl* In 1953, Reserve officials reduced their commitment
to the bond market further, and open-market policy was restricted
to short-term securities under normal circumstances.
For the most part, the years following World War II were a
period of progress and prosperity. The recessions were mild, as
a result of the following aids: appropriate monetary policy, the
structural strength of the financial system, the automatic opera¬
tions of Federal taxes and transfer payments, and, in some cases,
deliberate fiscal changes.
The alarm about post-war depression proved unwarranted. With
the end of the war in 19U5, private spending began to increase.
Most war-time controls were removed by 19U6, and constnner prices,
which had held fairly stable, now rose rapidly. By 19U8 they were
about one-third above 19^5 and 70 per cent above 19U0.1
Many people in and out of government were impressed by the
rapidity with which the economy was restored to full employment by
war-time finance, but they feared that prosperity would not
automatically sustain itself when the economy returned to peace.
This view drew support from past experience and also from the pre¬
dictions of economic forecasters. Using the data on the pre-war
behavior of consumption and investment, maiy forecasters drew the




people would try to do at fiill-etnployment income levels, so that
renewed stagnation might result* However, the spread of Keynesian
ideas and the war-time experience with fiscal policy appeared to
furnish an answer.
CHAPTER II
THE TRANSITION ERQM LIMirS IMPOSED BT
"WAR-TIME" CONDITIONS
The FlnahclJig of World War II.—As the years before 19U0 were
dominated by the problems of depression, the years following were
dominated by inflation. Price increases associated with World War
II continued through 19U8 and were followed by a subsequent out¬
burst attending the Korean conflict*
The American econon^ felt the impact of World War H even
before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December, 19Ul. Rising
defense orders from abroad and increased defense spending at home
raised OIP one-fourth in 19Ul and cut unemployment sharply. Once
the war commenced. Federal expenditures expanded at a rapid rate,
until near the end of the war in 19U5 they were running at an annual
rate of about $100 billion a year. An unprecedented portion of
national output was devoted to war purposes - about UO per cent for
the war period as a whole*
During the period from July, 19Ulj throu^ June, 19U5» the
Federal government spent an average of $76 billion a year. While it
managed to finance nearly half of this expenditure by taxes, a record
far superior to that of previous major wars, a large amount remained
to be financed by borrowing. The national debt was enlarged by over
$200 billion. Federal Reserve policy was utilized to enable these
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seoTirities to be sold without subjecting the Treasury to heavy
interest burdens. Indeed, interest rates were maintained at the
extremely low levels to which they had fallen during the depressed
1930's. The Interest cost of war issues averaged only about 2 per
cent.
Federal Eeserve assistance came in three foirms. Reserve
banks themselves purchased over $20 billion of securities. This
action created additional reserves which helped the commercial
banks purchase over $70 billion. The Federal Reserve also committed
itself to supporting the prices of securities, so that nonbank
investors had no reason to fear price declines below par a«id thus,
presumably, were willing to buy more.
The Treasury sought aggresively to sell bonds to nonbank
investors. Instead of encouraging sales by offering hi^er interest
rates, the Treasury emphasis was on "fitting the security to the
needs of the investor", creating a variety of securities with
special features to make them attractive to particular buyers at
low interest.^ The most important development was the wide use of
United States savings bonds, which had first been introduced during
the 1930's. These were, and are, nonmarketable securities issued
in small denominations and redeemable on demand (after sixty days)
at predetermined values. Those issued during the war had maturities
of ten years and an interest rate of 2;9 per cent compounded to
^enry Murphy, The National Debt in War and Transition
New York: (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950), p. 20.
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maturity, but much less if redeemed earlier* Business firms were
not permitted to bviy them, and individual pxirchases were limited
to $5»0CX) a year* The bonds were well designed as savings assets,
and ownership was very widespread. The Treasury also issued short¬
term securities designed for use by corporations to accumulate
d^ds for tax paynents*
The Treasury did issue a considerable volume of conventional
marketable securities ranging from three-month bills to long-term
boruis matluring after twenty years or more. A striking feature of
the marketable issues was the pronounced "rate pattern" under which
short-term bills carried a rate equivalent to only 0.375 per cent
a year, while the bonds of longest maturity were issued at 2.5 per
cent.^ Federal Reserve support ensured that each issue, tdiatever
its maturity, would be highly liquid and that its price would not
decline below par. Commercial banks were forbidden to buy bonds
with more than ten years remaining until maturity, and thus bank
purchases were diverted into the shorter maturities. Other investors
had little incentive to hold the low-yield short-term issues, since
longer-term ones were Just as liquid and paid much better. The
Treasury insisted on issuing three-month bills, with the inevitable
result that most of them gravitated into the Federal Reserve. By
the end of 19k$, $13 billion of the outstanding $17 billion of three-
month bills was held by Reserve banks.
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The general tendency of war-time debt management was to make
a.n United States securities highly liquid, chiefly throu^ the
support of the Federal Reserve. Treasury officials reasoned that
the assurance of liquidity would do more to promote bond sales
than would hi^er interest rates; and they could not offer both
incentive, since higher rates on new issues would have reduced
prices of the older marketable issues. The increase in the national






Debt Portion Owned By
Federal Reserve Commercial Banks 0bhers
Saving
Bonds Others
19U0 $ 39 $ 2 $ 17 $ 3 $ 17
19h$ 256 2h 91 143 98
Increase $ 217 $ 22 1 7li 1 ijO 1 81
Certainly the campaign to sell securities to nonbank buyers
met considerable success. Savings-bonds drives were conducted with
^otal debt excludes holdings of Federal agencies and Trust
Funds. Federal Reserve Bulletin, June, 19h3} June, l^US.
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an the resources of modern advertising, and it was estimated that
about one hundred million Americans bought savings bonds at one time
or another during the war. But the sales to noribank buyers were
large in part because of the large sales of securities to banks.
These sales created a great amount of money, part of idiich the
Treasury was then able to borrow back. By the end of the war the
public had increased its money supply by $60 billion and had added
$120 billion of highly liquid government securities to its holdings.
The Federal Reserve was torn between the objectives of aid¬
ing Treasury finance through easy credit and trying to curb
inflationary pressure. In addition to buying $22 billion of
securities, it maintained low discount rates, although the volumn
of rediscounting remained low during most of the war. Reserve
requirements were held at the maximum levels outside the central
reserve city group, idiich was subjected to only 20 per cent instead
of the maximum 26 per cent. Margin requirements on stock-market
loans were kept at 50 per cent until 19U^, as the market was
relatively quiescent.
The chief innovation in Reserve policy was the imposition of
direct control over consumer credit, beginning with Regulation ¥
in I9UI under authority of an Executive order of the President,
Under this credit control program the Board established minimum
down payments and maximum maturities for various types of purchases.
As a margin control, this regulation placed the Federal Reserve
in direct authority over nonbank firms, both financial and non-
financial. Consumer-credit control probably exerted some counter
inflationary influence, but the shortages of durable goods were a
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inore important reason for the substantial reduction in installment
debt \diich occurred during the war.
The Federal Reserve also used whatever powers of persuasion
it could muster to encourage banks to limit their private lending
activities, particularly to curtail "non-productive” loans (for
example, those for accumulatir^ large inventories). Such influence
may have helped produce the relative stability shown by commercial
bank loans in I9UI-I9UU, However, reduced needs for such loans
were more important. Firms producing for the war got their credit
from the government, while others soon had ample ftinds from rising
incomes.
The effects of war finance on the money supply were strickingly
simple. Commercial bank and Federal Reseive holdings of United
States securities increased about $100 billion, while other monetary
assets showed little change, Hon-monetaiy liabilities and capital
rose about $liO billion, leaving a $60 billion increase in the money
supply. By 19h$ the public’s money supply was 2§ times that of
19li0,^
Policy In Prosperity and Recession; I9U6-I9U8.—The alarm about
post-war depression proved unwarranted. With the end of the war in
I9U5, private spending began to increase. Most war-time controls
were removed by I9I4.6, and consumer prices, which had held fairly
stable, now rose rapidly. By I9U8 they were about one-third above
19h^ and 70 per cent above 19li.O,
Murphy, op, cit,, pp, 30-35,
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Despite the inflationary upsurge of prices, the Federal Reserve
continued support of bond prices or, as they repeatedly phrased it,
to ’’maintaining orderly conditions” in the bond market. Aggressive
initiative for this objective came from the administration,
particularly the Treastiry. The administration, wanted stable bond
prices and low interest rates to keep down the costs of the national
debt, which exceeded %2$Q billion and about $100 billion of securi¬
ties either maturing or redeemable in the near future. Although
the Treasxiry was not a net borrower,it wanted to avoid higher
rates on ref\inding issues. Furthermore, Treasury spokesmen argued,
falling bond prices might impair the soluency of financial
institutions which held large amounts, would be unfair to other
investors who brought in expectation of stable prices, and woiild
impair "confidence” and tindermine the government’s "credit.”
There was a more sophisticated economic defense of law
interest levels: They would promote a hi^ level of investment
which would help fill the deficiences of productive capacity left
by depression and war. Furthermore, despite the inflation there was
the lingering fear that serious depression would loom soon and that
credit restriction mi^t bring it on?-
The Federal Reserve Board sympathized with these objectives.
Marriner Eccles, the Chainoan of the Board, expressed the conviction
that restoration of an uncontrolled bond market would confront the
The early economic reports of the President Condemned price
inflation chiefly because of the fear that prices would get so high
that people would not buy current output, and a depression would
result. Economic Report of the President, January, 19U7, p« 19*
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Treasury with "an impossible debt-management problem*" He argued
that "it could not tell from day to day on what terms it coTold do
its refunding or sell new securities* It would be entirely at the
mercy of uncontrolled factors in the market^ if, indeed, conditions
did not become so confused and chaotic as to demoralize craapletely
its refunding operations*" The Board felt responsible for ensuring
that individual Treasury refunding operations would not fail*^
Reserve officials objected bitterly to the terms which the
Treasury insisted on, particularly the rates on short-term securi¬
ties* By a gradual process and against much Treasiiry opposition,
they managed to re-assert their point of view* In 19U6, the
preferential rate of 0*5 per cent for discounts on collateral of
United States securities was discontinued* In 19it.7> support was
withdrawn from short-term securities, and rates rose from the
artificial war-time levels to slightly over one per cent*
Nevertheless, the basic principle was maintained; that is;
long-term secTirities should not fall below par, nor rates rise above
per cent* In January, 191^8, President Truman’s economic report
reasserted this rule as a matter of faith* In this report he stated
that;
"No bonds, however, have been permitted to fall below
par and it is the declared purpose to continue active support
of Government bonds for the purpose of maintaining an orderly
wd stable market a.t a low level of long-term interest rates
****The financial world should rest easy that the investment
market will not be subjected to the demoralization which swept
^arriner Eccles, Beckoning Frontiers New York: Alfred A*
Knopf, Inc*, 1951), pp* 120-U21-C80*
21
over it in 1920 when the unsupported market for Government
bonds fell about 20 per cent below par.”^
Vniat were the actual effects of the support program? Federal
Reserve holdings of government securities did not rise above their
19U5 peak and actually diminished during much of 19li7i though a
sharp rise followed. Interest rates on the long-term bonds re¬
mained below the 2| per cent support level during 19U6-19U7* let
credit expanded rapidly in 19li6-19U8. Commercial bank loans rose
from $26 billion at the end of 19U5 to $U3 billion at the end of
19U8.
Three factors enabled the banks to carry out this great
expansion. First, the banks emerged from the war with over $1
billion of excess reserves. Second, the gold stock increased by
$h billion in 19U6-1914.8. Third, Treasury debt retirement provided
the banks with the funds to expand loans. As we noted, the Treasury
in 19l4.7-lS>Ii8 took in over $13 billion in surplus revenue which it
used for debt retirement. Furthermore, at the end' of the war the
Treasury bank account was swollen to over $2^ billion with the pro¬
ceeds of the last loan drive. Much of this was used for subsequent
debt retirement.
In its retirement policy, the Treasury followed the economists'
rule that retiring Reserve - held debt is the best policy to combat
inflation. Some $10 billion worth of Reserve - held securities
were retired^ but as fast as these retirements drew reserves out of
commercial banks, the banks merely sold more securities to the
Federal Reserve. Thus the funds withdrawn throu^ tax surpluses
Economic Report of the President, January, 19U8, pp. 85-86.
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returned to active circulation through bank loans. The bond -
support policy greatly reduced the counter inflationary influence
of the tax surplus.
In recognition of the veakness imposed by the support program.
Reserve officials sought methods by which provate credit could be
retained without raising interest rates on government securities.
They retained consxmer-credit controls until November, 19U7» when a
congressional resolution forced discontinuance. Controls prevented
the loosening of credit terms but did not prevent a rapid rise in
credit volume. Margin requirements on stock-market lending were
raised during 19li3 and were held at 100 per cent dtiring 19U6, In
February, 19^7, they were cut to 75 per cent, where they remained
until 19U9» Under high margin reqirements, stock-market credit
filled substantially in 19^6 and remained low throu^out the rest of
this inflationary period. However, banks may simply have enlarged
other lending more.
Reserve officials also urged congress to strengthen other
controls over private lending. Among their recommendations were
the novel suggestion that a required reserve of government securi¬
ties be added to existing reserve requirements and that reserve
requirements be extended to non-member banks. In the summer of
1914-8, President Truman, as an opening guest in his campaign for
re-election, called a special session of Congress to deal with
inflation. The chief results were the re-establishment of
temporary Reserve authority over consumer credit and a temporary
authorization to increase reserve requirements above the levels
in the existing law. In August, 19U8, Regulation W was reimposed.
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and credit expansion did slov down*
The public’s money supply increased by $11 billion from 19^5
to I9U7 through the reduction in the Treasury balance. In 19U8,
however, the money supply did not grow further; instead, velocity
increased. Commercial banks and other financial institutions sold
United States securities, on balance, to other Investors or received
the proceeds of Treasury debt retirement and expanded their lending
operations. The measures of I9U8 clearly imposed some credit
retirement. Both long-term bond and short-term bank interest rates
rose appreciably, and the volume of borrowing fell below that of
I9U7. But prices had stopped rising in the late summer of 19U8,
before the added restraining measures went into effect. The supply
of goods was catching up with demand as the capital-expenditure
programs began to bear fruit.
Establishment of International Monetary Institutions.—During
World War II, it seemed clear that the old gold standard was out of
the question for the world. The world’s stock of gold had become
so concentrated in the United States that the remainder would hardly
go around. The regidity of the gold standard put an economy so at
the mercy of developments elsewhere that measures for internal
stability and full employment might easily be defeated if changes
abroad were commiunicated by the gold standard.
Internal economic regidities seemed so common that business
would not respond well enough to changes to assxire reasonable
adjustment. Equally clear was the belief that the replacement
should certainly be something better than the confusion and
inherent instability of the 1930’s.
2h
Well before the end of World War II, the United States
government, in consultation with other governments, had begun work
on plans for the creation of new international institutions designed
to provide the frame work for a greater volume and freer flow of
international trade and investment. At an international financial
conference at Brettan Woods, New Hampshire, in 19l|ii, representatives
of forty-four governments drew up plans for two institutions de¬
signed to meet this need - the International Monetary Ihind and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
The International Monetary Fund agreement and organization
were designed to avoid repetition of the international financial
chaos of the 1930* s.^ By making available short-term loans of
foreign exchanges to countries experiencing international payments
deficits, the Fund was expected to enable such countries to resist
depression originating outside their borders without resorting to
exchange control or devaluation. As secondary goals, the Fund
agreement was to seek reduction of existing exchange controls and
bring member countries closer to convertible currencies with stable
exchange rates. The Fund a^eement was ratified from the start by
the United States, Britain, and other major Allied trading countries}
since then it has admitted Germany and Japan, and by 19^9 embraced
2
more than fifty countries. The major non-mmbers consisted of the
Soviet bloc.
Robert Triffin, Europe and the Money Muddle (Yale University
Press: New Haven, Conneticut, 1957), pp, 53-70,
^Ibid., p. 75.
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Technically, the loan operations of the Fund consist of sell¬
ing foreign currencies. Each member must contribute to the Capital
of the Fund a sum reflecting its size and economic importance.
'While a portion of this must be in gold, the bulk is in its home
currency, commonly in the form of bank deposits. The United States
provided 3h per cent and Great Britain l6 per cent of the initial
capital,^ In compensation, voting power in Fund decisions is
roughly proportioned to size of national quota.
Sales of foreign currencies from this post may be made to ary
member nation suffering a paytients deficit on current, not capital,
account, provided it deposits an equal par value of its own currency
plus a small premium. Each country's right to buy in this manner
is limited in proportion to its quota of the Fund's capital. Further
repayment is mandatory for stuns beyond 25 per cent of the borrower's
quota, and interest is changed on such funds. Finally, the Fund may
make access to its funds contingent on compliance concerning exchange
rate or domestic financial policies.
In regard to exchange controls, the member countries agreed
in principle to maintain convertibility of their currencies. How¬
ever, this commitment was weakened by several loopholes. Members
were entitled to retain exchange restrictions dtiring the transition
period immediately following the war and were permitted to impose
exchange controls over capital transactions.
^hiurles P, Klndleberger, International Economics (1st ed.j
Richard D, Irwin, Inc,, Homewood, Illinois, 1953)# p, U22,
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On the basis of Its first decade of operations, there was
considerable feeling that the Fund's actual performance had been
disappointing. Its lending operations were on a limited scale, and
it had not taken a very aggreslve role in pushing member countries
toward exchange liberalization. These short comings could be
excused in part by the limitations inherent in the relatively small
initial quotas, the United States originally suscribed $2.8 billion.
Also, the large volume of American foreign aid reduced the
\irgent need for Fund lending. However, the Fund's position on ex¬
change rates and controls was less defensible. It was probably
overly hasty in getting initial exchange rates set in 191^6 but
subsequently appeared vinduiy tolerant of tinwholesome multiple ex-
change-rate systems not consistent with the Fund agreement. The
Fund never succeeded in encouraging a multilateral swapping of
concessions comparable to the results achieved by the European
Payment Union.^
Much of this disappointing record can be attributed to the
fact that, for the industrialized world, post-war payments problems
were not those for which the Fund was designed. Payments deficits
originated more often from inflationary pressure in the deficit
countries than from depression elsewhere.
Vlhile the emphasis of the International Monetary Fund was
on stability and freedom in international payments, the International




long-tem international investments. Like the International
Monetary Fund, it commenced with a capital subscribed by its members
totaling about the same as that of the Fund, about $8 billion*
However, only one-fifth of this was called for in cash, and only
2 per cent had to be paid in gold or dollars - except for the United
States* The 18 per cent paid in local ciirrency could be used only
with the consent of the country involved, and the 80 per cent re¬
mainder was simply a guarantee fund*
The bank commenced operations in 19U6 and made its first
loans in 19U7* About half a billion dollars were lent to European
countries for reconstruction purposes, but since 19U8 its loans
have gone chiefly to underdeveloped countries outside Europe* Its
gross volume of lending has been small, slightly over $3 billion
actually disbiirsed through 1958, of which $2.6 billion remained to
be repaid. About one-third of the total went to Continental Western
Europe, another third to the sterling area, and the rest to Asia
and Latin America.
Besides its capital, the bank had $1.8 billion of bonds out¬
standing in December, 1953. Its credit standing was high, and it
was able to issue bonds on favorable terms*^ The bank relied only
to a limited degree on its guarantee option, though 1953 it had
resold $260 million of loans to other Investors, and not all of these
bore its guarantee*
federal Reserve Bulletin, February, 1959, p* 232*
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The importance of the bank is probably greater than the volume
of its loans would indicate. It has played a strategic role in
project planning and in encouraging private financing of revenue -
yielding projects. Its loans generally only cover the foreign
expenditures associated with a project^ and further sums derived
fnom local loans or taxation are usually added. Many of the pro¬
jects it has financed are of to encourage further private invest-
mentj, power and transport facilities, for instance. And its
influence has been exerted to improve the credit worthiness of
borrowers. Most observers feel that the Bank has become a valuable
institution of international finance.^
In general, it would seem that a reasoned balance needs to
be stuck between the extremes of over caution in making capital
available to tuiderdeveloped coiintries and of assuming that the
parity of external capital assistance is the only barrier to
economic development, A combination of: (1) more vigorous efforts
on the part of the recipient countries to prepare themselves for
efficient use of additional capital and (2) a more liberal lending
policy on the part of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development would undoubtedly produced considerably more rapid pro¬
gress toward the goal of raising the standard of living in im¬
poverished areas.
Alec Cairncross, "The International Bank For Reconstruction
and Development," Essays in Internationa Finance, Princeton Univer¬
sity, International Finance Section, 19^9, No, 33*
CHAPTER III
SICMIFICANT CHMGES IN THE EARIZ 195© *3
Monetary policy forms with fiscal policy and debt management
a trinity of iinequals which, to be fully effective, demand close
coordination.
At the end of World War II, the fortunes of Federal Reserve
policy had reached their all-time low. They had been declining
ever since the fateful dsys in 1929 and 1930, when the full weight
of monetary policy had been thrown against the onrushing depres¬
sion, and had produced no visible effects. They had continued to
drop throughout the '30’s, as the Federal Reserve System watched
other agencies of the federal government expand their monetary,
fiscal and political powers, while its own tools were increasingly
paralyzed by the depression. The nadir was reached in 19U^ when
the Treasury, having availed itself of the Federal Reserve for war
financing, now expected the System to become a continuing and
submissive instrument for solving the problems of federal debt
management.
In the second half of 1914-7, the Treasury at long had agreed
to let the Federal Reserve withdraw support from Treasury bills
and certificates, the chief short-term instruments. With this
action, the ^stem created the first modest amount of manamerability
for monetary policy. Next, during the inflation of 19U8, the dis-
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count rate was raised from 1 to per cent. At that time, the
System found itself compelled to support the long-term United
States government bond market on a large scale. It succeeded,
however, in draining off most of the reserves created through these
purchases by simultaneous sales of short federal maturities at
rising rates. Member bank reserve reqirements also were raised,
as paid/ of the anti-inflationary campaign, although the System
itself, through open market purchases, had to supply most of the
additional reserves, to avoid heavy vinloading of government
securities by the banks. Yet here were the small beginning of
the new freedom for monetary policy.
The recession of 19U9 temporarily allowed the System to
shift gears, legal reserve requirements were lowered again,
beginning May, 19U9. The System sold long-term bonds to keep the
market from rising too high.
In June, 19U9, at last, the question was faced of withdraw¬
ing the peg from the long-term rate. Finding the market floating
well above its peg, the System seized the opportinity to announce
a new policy: henceforth open market operations were to be conducted
not to maintain a fixed pattern of interest yields but to meet the
needs of the business and credit situation and to maintain orderly
conditions in the government securities market. This brave state¬
ment was so worded, however, as to leave open the basic question
whether support of United States government securities at par would
be withdrawn or not, should the market decline to that level.
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T/Jhen iiiflationasry pressures revived in 1950, the Korean War raised
the possibility of new large-scale federal financing. The Treasiiry
made clear that it would not agree to a flexible long-term interest
rate* Par support therefore did not change.
Subsequently the difference between the Treasury and Federal
Reserve sharpened. The conflict was terminated by the Accord of
March U, 195l» The two agencies agreed that the government bond
market was to find its own level subject to a number of actions
designed to smooth the transition and ease the Treasury’s financ¬
ing problems. Some of the long-term government bonds that were
over hanging the market and might have provoked panicky sales were
removed by a voluntary exchange into non-marketable securities.
The Federal Reserve agreed to give the long-term market enough sup¬
port to keep it orderly. It also agreed to keep the discount rate
at its then c\irrent level of 1 3/h per cent and to support the re¬
funding operations of the Treasiiry for the remainder of 1951. Sub¬
ject to these reasonable conditions, monetary policy at last had
regained its freedom.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy and Debt Management.—At various
times since the war, the efforts of monetary policy have received
a powerful assist from fiscal policy. The first instance that
comes to mind is the inflation of 19li7-19U8, when massive Treasury
surpluses helped to mop up purchasing power and bank reserves. One
cannot actually say that fiscal and monetary policy, were pulling
in harness, because monetary policy, then still indentured to the
Treasury's debt management, was compelled to take actions that
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were inflationary in their effects. But fiscal policy undid some
of the unintended harm.
In I9U8, when inflation still seemed in progress, a tax cut
was forced upon a reluctant Administration by Congress. As fate
would have it, this proved a master stroke of fiscal policy.
Shortly after, the economy went into recession, and the tax cut
helped to extricate it.
Once more during the 1953-^ recession fiscal policy came to
the rescue with a tax cut. This cut, however, was designed chiefiy
to counteract the rapid contraction of military expenditures which,
in turn, had helped to provoke the recession. On balance, fiscal
policy was pointed toward contraction, for the deficit declined
from 9.5 million in fiscal 1953 to 3.1 billion in fiscal 195U.^
At the same time, changes were mauie in the Internal Revenue Code
designed to stimulate investment permanently. Chiefly among them
were provisions for accelerated amortization of equipment. These
changes no doubt contributed to the resurgence of investment.
Finally, when fiscal policy succeeded in eliminating the
deficit in fiscal 1956 and 1957* the action also served to back-
step monetary policy and its anti-inflationary campaign. Without
this fiscal effort, the pressure upon monetary policy during those
years would have been even greater.
So much for the instances of coordination. Occasions have
not been lacking when fiscal policy ran center to monetary policy.
Reserve Bulletin, Febmary, 1950, p. 22$,
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This happened particularly when changing defense needs brought
sharp increases or reductions in military spending. In fiscal
1951, for instance, the budget inevitably became inflationary
despite rising tax rates. Again in the spring of 1957, an un¬
intended spurt in military spending added to inflationary pressure.
Later in the year, the expansion of expenditures aggravated the
recession that had meanwhile begtui*
On its surface, the record seems to suggest that despite
some notable failures, the cases of successful cooperation pre¬
dominate. But the depressing fact must be faced that cooperation
between fiscal and monetary policy seems to have happened more
often by accident than by design.
The timely tax cuts occurred largely for reasons not directly
related to anticyclical policy. Where monetary and fiscal policy
consciously pulled in harness, as during 1955-1956, there still is
little evidence of flexibility on the fiscal side. That puts a
rather sad face upon the record.
How effectively had debt management been coordinated with
monetary policy? Ever since the big debt made its appearance, two
potentialities have been diagnoses for it. The debt could become
a major obstruction to a stabilizing monetary policy. The debt
could also be turned into an instrument of stabilization in its
own right that wovile help monetary and fiscal policy. The historian
of the post-war period is compelled to report that the debt seems
in fact to have done little of either.
Before the Accord, monetary policy had been forcibly coordin¬
ated with debt management. The compulsion to peg the government bond
3h
market had virtually nullified monetary policy as a stabilizing
force* After the Accord these remained, for a couple of years,
an obligation to support Treasury financing, whicji interferred
occasionally with proper stabilization policy until that legacy
of the ’UO‘s was forgotten.
Constructive coordination of debt management with monetary
policy has been witnessed on several occasions since the Accord.
In the spring of 19^3> when inflationary pressures were building
up and the Federal Reserve was tightening credit, the Treasury
tried to lend a hand by putting out a long-term issue. The
experience was not a happy one, however: the bond market went
into a scare, the Federal Reserve soon had to reverse its policy
and the 3^ coupon issue went to an embarrassing premivim.
In the recession of 1953-195U the Treasury once more
cooperated with the Federal Reserve by not issuing a long-term bond
that would have prevented long-term interest rates from coming
down. By financing short, it contributed to the easy money policy
of the system.
In the following boom, when cooperation with monetary policy
woxxld have required long-term financing to fund the floating debt,
the Treasury found the going difficult. Long-term issues were
hard to place, even at high interest rates. The anti-inflationaay
support that one would have liked to see on this front could not,
as a practical matter, be brought to bear.
The recession of 1957-1958 once more called for short-term
financing to aid the Federal Reserve* s easy money policy. But
by now the Treasury had become seriously disturbed about the
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succession of alternating obstacles that always seemed to interfere
with its basic endeavor to lengthen the debt* In the face of more
or less overly-voiced protests, the Treasury proceeded to put out
several long-term issues in its financing operations from November
1957 to June 1958* In a rising laarket, these issues were well
received; but th^ probably helped to keep long-term rates hi^er,
and so may have interferred with monetary policy objectives.
Is Inflation Inevitable?,—Inflation may be defined as a
condition in vdiich money incwnes are rising faster than the flow
of goods and services on which to spend them, that is to say faster
than the real national income* The real national income, in turn,
depends mainly on the volume of ctirrent domestic output, and
thougih at times it may also be affected by changes in the relative
prices at which part of the output is exchanged for imports, and
in the amoxint of investment income received from, or paid to,
foreign countries, these last two factors are usually of secondary
importance. Broadly, therefore, it may be said that inflation is
a condition in which incomes are rising faster than output.
To check inflation it is necessary either to accelerate the
rise in output without a corresponding acceleration of the rise
in incomes, or to slow down the rise in incomes without a correspond¬
ing slowing-down of the rise in output. Unfortunately, in condi¬
tions where inflation already exists, attempts to accelerate the
rise in output tend to involve more than proportionate rise in
incomes, while although the checking of a rise in incomes usually
involves some check to the rise in output, the slowing-down of
the rise in output is usually less than the slo,wing-down of the
rise in incomes. Thus to check inflation it is usually necessary
to slow down the rise in incomes, even though this Tiri.ll probably
involve at least a temporary check to the rise in output.
In order to check a rise in incomes, it is necessary to
check the rise in. those forms of expenditure which create incomes.
Not all expenditures is income-creating. If more money is spent
on bTxying existing durable goods, or on titles to assets or to
money, the rise in their prices does nothing directly to raise the
level of incomes. If A buys an existing house from B, the sale in
itself does nothing to raise incomes except, perhaps, the income
of the house - agent. Only if B then proceeds to spend the money
by having a new house built, or in other ways which involves the
creation of incomes by payments for the services of persons or of
their assets, does the higher price by A lead to higher incomes.
If it is possible to ensure that money paid for existing
assets is not used except to pay for other existing assets, its
expenditure is not inflationary, however for it raises asset prices
all that it does is to bring down the rate of interest. There is,
however, a strong probability that the higher prices of existing
assets and the lower rates of interest will make it more profitable
to construct new physical assets, and that sooner or later income-
creating expenditures will also rise unless they are in some way
preverted from doing so.
In an isolated country, the effects of income rising faster
than output will show themselves entirely in a rise in prices. If,
however, there are a number of countries of which only one is
inflating, the excessive rise in income and in demand there will
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not only force up internal prices, but will attract additional
imports from abroad and will divert resources away from producing
exports to satisiy the home demand. Internal inflation, at a rate
faster than in other countries, thus tends to bring a rise in
imports, a fall in exports and an adverse balance of payments.
The larger amount of goods thus made available on the home market
will slow down the internal rise in prices.
The task of checking inflation is rendered more difficult
by the fact that it is frequently inconsistent with other objectives
of policy, such as a maximum rate of output and a very low level .
of unemployment. An excess demand for goods and services leads
directly to an excess demand for labor. When there are many more
jobs vacant in a cotintry than there are people genuinely looking
for them, it is likely that anyone who leaves one job for any
reason will quickly find another in his own line of business and
his own district. If, however, the demand for labor is no greater
than the supply, so that the number of vacancies is not greater
than that of men seeking work, there is a much greater probability
that is to find work a man will have to change his job or leave
his district, or both. This will inevitably take longer, and the
number of unemployed will rise. If, therefore, political considera¬
tions require a government to try to maintain a lower level of
unemployment than is consistent with the absence of inflation, the
problem of stopping inflation may be insoluble.
The Problems of Coordination.—Any given objective of govern¬
ment policy can be more effectively pursued if the agencies con¬
cerned act in a coordinated manner. There is little doubt that
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Federal policies for economic stabilization could be made more
effective if they were promoted by the coordinated monetary, fiscal,
and credit policies and agencies of the government. The real
difficulty is not that several agencies need to be coordinated but
that these agencies and their operating responsibilities are sub¬
ject to a variety of objectives, some of which are not consistent
with stabilization* The Treasury inevitably prefers low interest
rates, and individual credit agencies desire to expand the avail¬
ability of funds for £iousing, agriculture, ot other particular
sectors. These conflicts can be traced back through Congress to
strong political pressures from the public.
While the existence of conflicting objectives is probably
inevitable, there is still much room for beneficial increase in
communication and coordination among the agencies involved.
Communication can help to show how different objectives do con¬
flict and to clarify their relative priorities. In the Jrears prior
to 19^1, the obstinacy of the Treasury and the administration in
adhering to the bond - support program partly due to lack of per¬
ception that the program was contributing to harmful inflation and
to an exaggerated fear of the consequence of discontinuing support.
Since 19^1 better understanding of the economic harm of pegging
bond prices and of the priorities to be attached to low interest
rates versus a stable price level has prevailed.
Much of the difficulty of coordination arises from the fact
that congress and many administration agencies have a strong
clientele bias; that is, they are, consciously or \inconsciously,
working to promote the interests of particular economic groups at
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the expense of the rest of the econoiay. Both theory and experience
suggest that the clientele bias is a sertous obstacle to effective
stabilization policy. It may cause an emphasis on the wrong kinds
of policies, as the restrictionist New Deal measures to aid
business, labor, and agriculture. Clientelism also has an
inflationary bias. While it is impossible to give each sector of
the economy a larger share of the national product, it may be
possible to keep each one contented if total money income is rising
rapidly. This usually requires that income rise faster than out¬
put grows, and inflation results.
If stabilization is to win out as an important objective, it
must have the support of agencies which are not weakened by
clientelism. The Federal Reserve is one such agency. It is
relatively free to operate in its own sphere, and in addition
Reserve officials can play a constructive role in general policy¬
making through advice to the President, testimoiy before congressional
committees, and public pronouncements. Chairmen Eocles and Martin
have both dealt extensively with topics going beyong monetary
policy, fiscal policy and taxation, direct controls, etc.
However, the degree of policy coordination required for
effective stabilization policy can only be achieved through the
active support of the President. His position is relatively free
from the taint of clientelismj he is in a position to control
important elements of debt management and credit policy; and his
political power is great enough for him to furnish effective leader¬
ship to Congress in fiscal policy and related amatters. The Employ-
ment Act of 19i|.6 confers responsibi^ty for economic welfare on the
President j in the words of Clinton Rossiter, he is '*Manager of
Prosperity,” a poUcy responsibility second orGy to national security.
President Eisenhower sought such coordination in several ways*
He supported the independence of the Federal Reserve in relation
to Congress and the administration. Treasury debt management be¬
came reconciled to accepting rather than making interest rates.
Administratively, the President aided coordination by establishing
the Advisory Board on Economic Growth and Stability, headed by the
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and including a member
of the Board of Governors as well as representatives of Cabinet
departments. Considerable effort was expanded on reconciling govern¬
ment credit program with monetary policy. Late in 1959> the
President appointed Raymond Soulnier, Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers, to be director of the Federal National Mortgage
Association, an important landing agency.^
In practice, complete coordination between the Federal Reserve,
the administration, and Congress is probably neither possible nor
even desirable, since the President and Congress must compromise
among a multitude of objectives. This situation should,. however,
permit the Federal Reserve to concentrate on its own goal and to
Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 21-23.
E. A. Goldenweiser, American Monetary Policy (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951), p. 2(37.
and to preach it to the rest of the government.
Much of the desire for coordination was really a desire for
something else, for general agreement among officials on a course
of policy would seirve the public interest well. More coordination
as such does not ensure such results, which could not be guaranteed
by any mechanical agreements. Coordination on behalf of incorrect
policies may be worse than disagreement. Informed consensus rather




The last several years have brought an extraordinary out¬
put of private and governmental studies of American Monetary problems
as well as a great many additional primary data. I think this
evidence as a whole indicates clearly that while the general per¬
formance of our monetary and banking system since l^U^ has not
been very bad, it has also not been very good.
There have been three substantial though not severe recessions;
the process of inflation has been substantially retarded since
19ij.8, but consumer prices have risen in every subsequent year except
two; and for nearly a decade our aggregate real growth, as measured
by GNP in constant dollars, has on the average slowed down. Most
scholars seem to agree that we mi^t well have done a good deal
better, though they differ about the severity of the deficiencies.
It would obviously be unfair either to give monetary policy
sole credit for the measure of success we have achieved, or to
assign to it the sole blame for our shortcomings. Ever since the
Accord of 1951> however, general monetary policy has been our most
important instrument of discretionary economic control, and the
monetary authorities have used their weapons quite deliberately to
help achieve broad economic objectives.
In deciding what should appropriate monetary policy, I shall
outline, with only a minimum of discussion, monetary policy from
two points: (1) cylical policy, and (2) long-run policy.
Cylical Policy.—We shall never be able to pursue a vigorous
policy of "high pressure" economics until we succeed in smoothing
out investment spurts like the one in 1955-19^7. In order to keep
the econony fairly close to the full employment celling over the
long-run, it will be necessaiy to achieve a higher degree of
cylical stability than thus far realized. Otherwise, we nan into
inflationary pressures as in 1955-1957 and presently.
This will require a strengthening of our built-in stabilizers.
Among the tools that could be employed in our stabilization policy
are the following; (1) an automatic counter-cylical adjustment of
the first-bracket income tax, (2) counter-cylical adjustment of
accelerated depreciation, (3) a tax on excessive spurts of invest¬
ment as employed in Sweden - more effective than a high rate of
interest - and (U) specific controls of consumer and real estate
credit applied counter-cylically.
Monetary policy should move rapidly to create ample liquidity
and low interest rates at the first sign of recession. It should
make a modest contribution to restraint when the economy orubs up
against the full employment ceiling.
Long-Run Policy.--Monetary policy should seek to achieve a
low long-i*un rate of interest. The arbitrary per cent ceiling
should be repealed. Congress should not attempt to fix the rate
of interest by law. But the monetary authoa:d.ties should pursue
policies tending to produce low long-term rates. Cyclical spurts
of investment should be prevented as far as possible, put the long-
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run ratio of investment to (2IP should be increased in order to
promote a higher rate of growth. Two things are necessary to
achieve this goal* (1) increased investment to basic scientific
and technological research, and (2) low long-term rates of interest.
Technology and low interest rates are the principle means of open¬
ing up investments outlets,
A monetary policy of low interest rates will have to be matched
by a stiff fiscal policy designed to offset, through its restraint
of consumption, the inflationary pvirsures caused by the increase
in investment incident to rapid technological advance and low
interest rates.
Monetary policy can promote low long-term rates of interest
by strengthening the government bond market both on the supply side
and the demand side. On the supply side a large portion of the
marketable bonds could be taken off the market altogether by
introducing the sectxrity reserve system, thereby freezing a
considerable part of the public debt into the port-folio of the
commercial banks. On the demand side the Federal Reserve could
bring effective support to the U, S, securities market by open
market purchases whenever the growth of the econos^ requires an
increase in the monetary base of the commercial banking system.
Monetary expansion should not be achieved, except possibly
cyclically, by the method of reducing reserve requirements. Indeed
open market purchases could be pushed much farther than indicated
by the requirements of growth. Purchases in excess of growth require
ments could be offset by raising the reserve requirements. The
maximum limit on reserve ratios should be raised to say BO per cent
to give the Board utmost freedom to play a really effective role
as a powerful factor influencing the long-term rate of interest.
In addition to the monetary policies indicated above, a
budgeting surplus would increase the flow if investment funds and
help to maintain a low rate of interest. A strongly expansionist
expenditure program, public investment for growth both in terms
of human and national resources, would probably require a budget
surplus in order to contain inflationary pressures. This might
or might not be the case, depending upon a variety of circumstances
which cannot be determined in advance. The larger the budget, the
stronger the expansionist pressures, and the greater the need for
the restraining effect of a surplus.
Finally, in order to promote a low long-term rate of interest
the Treasury should float such intermediate or long-term bonds as
it is deemed desirable to issue, in periods when interest rates
are relatively low. The Federal Reserve can offset and stiffen
impact on rates by providing still more liquidity. Floating long¬
term bonds in high interest rate periods tends to raise the long¬
term rate of interest in the economy as a whole and thereby
hampers growth.
Moreover, this practice in effect employs debt management as
a device to worsen the distribution of income. Any policy which
tends to raise the rate on marketable issues, and indeed to raise
the rate of interest generally in the entire community, has the
effect of promoting concentration of income. The argument here,
it should be noted, is not against the public debt as such, but
rather against a specific method of debt management.
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